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Note
Salvaging Recreational Boating: Reforming an
Antiquated Maritime Practice
STEVEN WINTERS
This note looks at the history and development of the law of maritime salvage
from antiquity to its modern iteration and outlines how the modern recreational
mariner is being made the victim of an outdated and imbalanced system. In doing
so, this article looks at the evolution of maritime salvage laws and the public policies
that support and argues that the reasons underlying those policies have either
evaporated as society and technology have changed and that salvage law, in the
context of recreational vessels, is grossly mismatched to the realities of modern
boating and needs to be changed to reflect current maritime practices and protect
recreational boaters.
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Salvaging Recreational Boating: Reforming an
Antiquated Maritime Practice
STEVEN WINTERS *
INTRODUCTION
The phrase “maritime salvage” will often call to mind images of James
Cameron’s exploration of the Titanic or engender fantasies about aquatic
Indiana Jones-esque adventuring and treasure hunting. Indeed, roughly half
of the international salvage trade is made up of wreck recovery; however,
that number has been steadily decreasing for more than a decade, and the
contract salvage of individual private vessels has been on the rise.1 Problems
arise when recreational sailors are forcibly brought into the archaic and
complex world of salvage law and are pressured into salvage contracts that
they can’t hope to understand.
The recreational boating industry has exploded in popularity in recent
years; as of 2014 there were 15.8 million recreational vessels in use in
America, and more than 87 million Americans participated in recreational
sailing.2 Compare this to just over 100 years ago when there were only
15,000 recreational vessels on American waters,3 and it’s easy to see that
recreational sailors are taking over navigable waters in America.4 Despite
the aquatic and economic dominance of amateur recreational vessels,
maritime law remains a morass of arcane legal concepts through which the
inexperienced must struggle.

*

University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2018.
International Salvage Union 2015 Statistics Demonstrate the Value of the Salvage Industry, INT’L
SALVAGE UNION (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.marine-salvage.com/media-information/pressreleases/international-salvage-union-2015-statistics-demonstrate-the-value-of-the-salvage-industry/
[https://perma.cc/DN47-J44G]. The data is published by the International Salvage Union and gathered
from its members. It is important to note that these values represent numbers on an international scale
and tend to exclude smaller scale salvage operations and individual salvors.
2
2014 Recreational Boating Statistical Abstract, NAT’L MARINE MFRS. ASS’N, 2 tbl.1.1, 133 tbl.7.1
(2015), http://www.nmma.org/assets/cabinets/Cabinet449/Preview.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6NE-YJEF].
3
Joseph E. Choate, Recreational Boating: The Nation’s Family Sport, 313 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 109, 110 (1957).
4
See Matthew Chambers & Mindy Liu, Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers,
HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL LIBR., 1 (2014), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=715479
[https://perma.cc/HS93-8WXU] (reporting that water transportation contributed $36 billion to the
economy); Boat Sales on the Rise Heading into Summer, NAT’L MARINE MFRS. ASS’N (May 24, 2016),
https://www.nmma.org/press/article/20566 [https://perma.cc/MW3Y-6HJV] (reporting that the
recreational boating industry has an economic impact of more than $121.5 billion).
1
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Recreational vessel owners will often learn about salvage law only when
they are served with a salvage claim, creating an opportunity for predatory
salvors to overcharge distraught vessel owners. Pure salvage in the context
of recreational vessels presents two major issues by which salvors can prey
on recreational sailors and take advantage of their inexperience. The first
issue is that the legal definition of “peril” includes situations that the layman
would never anticipate or consider to be a danger.5 The second major issue
that faces recreational vessel owners in the salvage context is that the
difference between towage and salvage is simultaneously highly technical
and nebulously defined by courts.6 This is compounded by the fact that many
recreational vessel owners have preexisting towage contracts with terms
providing for assistance in situations such as “soft ungrounding[s],”7 yet aid
rendered in ungrounding a vessel from the beach is considered salvage and
falls outside such a towage contract.8
I.

WHAT IS THE LAW OF SALVAGE?

A. History and Evolution of Salvage Law
Salvage law has its origins in the ancient Roman concept of negotiorum
gestio, a legal principle which gave “to the volunteer who preserved or
improved the property of another a right of compensation from the owner,
although the services were rendered without the owner’s request or even
without his knowledge.”9 Negotiorum gestio was later codified into Roman
law as a form of maritime salvage that looks shockingly similar to the current
iteration.10 The concept of salvage was maintained in the Mediterranean area
for some time and can be seen in the Marine Ordinances of Trani, a city in
Italy circa 1063 C.E., which further provided that anyone who found goods
“cast upon the sea” was entitled to half the value of the goods in the event

5

See David Liscio, Know Your Salvage Rights, SAILING MAG., Apr. 4, 2013,
http://sailingmagazine.net/article-1332-know-your-salvage-rights.html [https://perma.cc/K87V-RZ7Y]
(relating a situation in which a recreational boat owner was charged with a large salvage bill for
seemingly innocuous services).
6
See Mahoney Marine Servs., v. Ellie Rose, 2002 A.M.C. 2838, 2840–42 (2002) (Cattell, Jr., Arb.)
(describing the salvage of a distressed vessel that is legally, but not plainly, distinct from towage);
MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE §§ 16–19, at 25–31 (1958) (discussing the technical definition
of towage and how it is legally distinct, but often not plainly distinct, from salvage).
7
Ellie Rose, 2002 A.M.C. at 2842.
8
Id. at 2842–43.
9
NORRIS, supra note 6, § 6, at 6.
10
See id. § 5, at 4 (discussing how the Roman statute served to codify the much older Rhodian law).
In relevant part, the statute read “If a ship be surprised at sea with whirlwinds, or be shipwrecked, any
person saving anything of the wreck, shall have one-fifth of what he saves.” Id. The statute also allowed
for a greater reward depending on the depth from which the salvage was drawn. Id. at 5.
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that the owner came forward, and if the owner did not, they were entitled to
the entire value of the goods.11
The concept of maritime salvage was introduced to England in the late
12th century by Richard the First in the form of the Laws of Oleron.12 The
Laws of Oleron contained much of the same language as the earlier
Mediterranean laws but also greatly expanded the scope of awardable
salvage and incorporated many of the elements of modern salvage law.13 As
feudalism grew in England, the older view of salvage began to fade away,
and any shipwrecked property came to be seen as the property of the lord
upon whose land the property came to lay.14
This view of salvage, commonly known as “pure salvage,” is “salvage
that is conducted without a pre-existing agreement between the salvor and
the owner of the property to be salved.”15 This is not, however, the only form
of salvage; in 1890, contract salvage first appeared in the form of the Lloyd’s
Open Form (LOF).16 The original salvage agreement involved Lloyd’s of
London, an international insurance organization. Salvage service was
granted on an ad hoc basis and the parties agreed that the award would be
decided by Lloyd’s at a later date.17 Two years later, Lloyd’s published the
first ad hoc salvage form for widespread use, and in 1908, the first
standardized LOF was published.18 The LOF swiftly came to dominate the
realm of the salvage award, and arbitration before the Committee at Lloyd’s
of London displaced almost all other forms of determining a salvage
award.19 The LOF has, however, come under criticism in America, and some
courts will no longer enforce LOF contracts because they violate the Federal

11

Id. § 7, at 7.
Id. § 8, at 8.
13
See id. at 8–13 (taking a dim view of the formation of contracts while a vessel was in danger and
allowing for courts to assign a value to the salvage apart from what the contract stated, as a sort of earlier
arbitration). The law also condemned opportunistic salvors and condemned any lord who condoned such
practices to be “fastened to a post or stake in the midst of his own mansion house, which being fired at
the four corners, all shall be burnt together, the walls thereof shall be demolished, the stones pulled down,
and the place converted into a market place for the sale only of hogs and swine to all posterity.” Id. at
10. This is a more extreme measure than this Note purports to take.
14
Id. § 11, at 15.
15
Edward V. Cattell, Jr., Recreational Vessel Salvage Arbitration: An Interim Report, 29 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 257, 258 (1998).
16
Donald R. O’May, Lloyd’s Form and the Montreal Convention, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1412, 1413
(1983).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See Alex L. Parks, The 1910 Brussels Convention, The United States Salvage Act of 1912, and
Arbitration of Salvage Cases in the United States, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1486 (1983) (discussing the
history of salvage arbitration in the United States).
12
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20

Arbitration Act. The development of the LOF and salvage arbitration in
America will be more fully discussed below in Part III.
American courts have recognized salvage since their inception;21
rejecting the English system where the Crown and the local lord had a claim
on the salvage property, the courts followed a “liberal approach to
salvage.”22 Perhaps the first case the Supreme Court heard on the issue of
salvage was Mason v. Blaireau,23 in which Justice Marshall upheld the
Rhodian concept of providing a “very ample reward” to a voluntary salvor.24
Salvage law has remained very steady in American courts since its inception,
as the underlying policies and reasoning set out by Justice Clifford remained
steadfast hallmarks of salvage claims for centuries.25 The development of
American salvage law will be more fully discussed below in Part III.
B. Salvage Law as a Matter of Public Policy
From its beginning, the concept of maritime salvage has been rooted in
a strong public policy of encouraging “the hardy and adventurous mariner
to engage in . . . laborious and sometimes dangerous enterprises.”26
Furthermore, in order to ensure that any would-be salvor did not turn to
piracy, the law allowed for a “liberal compensation” in order to
“withdraw . . . every temptation of embezzlement and dishonesty.”27 As
discussed above, the modern concept of salvage has its roots in an era when
the distinction between a pirate and an honest sailor was often a matter of
only a few degrees; as such, any incentive to aid a boat had to be large
enough to outweigh the incentive of waiting out the survivors and taking
what remained of the ship and its cargo. From that vantage point, the
large-percentage awards for salvage make a great deal of sense and are not
only justified, but serve the dual purposes of ensuring that people are helped
and that piracy is curtailed. However, it is fair to say that in the modern era,
concerns of piracy are minimal, therefore the question of what policy
20
See Brier v. Northstar Marine, Inc., 1993 A.M.C. 1194, 1211 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that the
arbitration clause of a LOF contract was void for violating the FAA as the parties had insufficient
connection to the extra-judicial area of enforcement).
21
The maritime law of salvage has been recognized in America for longer than America has been
a country. See NORRIS, supra note 6, §§ 13–14, at 17–18 (discussing how admiralty matters were borne
out in the vice-admiralty courts of the American colonies and noting that “[s]alvage cases were not rare”).
22
Andrew Anderson, Salvage and Recreational Vessels: Modern Concepts and Misconceptions, 6
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 203, 207 (1993).
23
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804).
24
Id. at 266.
25
See The Clarita, 90 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1874) (“Public policy encourages the hearty and industrious
mariner to engage in these laborious and sometimes dangerous enterprises, and with a view to withdraw
from him every temptation to dishonesty the law allows him, in case he is successful, a liberal
compensation.”).
26
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 10 (1869).
27
Id. at 14.
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reasons still justify the existence of such liberal salvage awards, particularly
in the recreational context, remains.
The underlying public policy reasons of maritime salvage have shifted
from curtailing piracy towards encouraging those at sea to assist distressed
seafarers and ensure that as few people as possible are injured.28 While the
importance of ensuring that seafarers are safe and that every measure should
be taken to assist people who are stranded at sea is as true today as it was in
the time of the Law of Oleron, it cannot be overstated how much the safety
of sailors has increased in modern times29 with advancements in GPS
technology,30 heightened safety requirements,31 and the availability of
publicly funded assistance, such as the Coast Guard.32 So while it is correct
to say that modern public policy justifications for salvage law include the
safety of seafarers, the often extreme cost to the unsuspecting and untrained
recreational vessel owner far outweighs any potential safety benefit when
there are any number of more effective and cost-conscious methods
available.
If curtailing piracy is no longer a pressing issue for modern maritime
law, and the safety of seafarers is adequately guarded by other more effective
28
See id. (explaining how compensation in the form of salvage functions as an inducement to action
to save life and property at sea); The Clarita, 90 U.S. at 16 (the purpose is to “encourage[] . . . mariner[s]
to engage in . . . laborious and . . . dangerous enterprises”).
29
See Mick Bloor, Fatalities at Sea: The Good and the Bad News, SEA (July/Aug. 2008),
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/The%20Sea/194%20jul-aug%2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YTH634VF] (noting that in 1885, one in every seventy-three seafarers would die at sea, compared to a rate of
twelve per 100,000 in the United Kingdom between 1996 and 2005—a rate that was “less than a third of
the . . . rate for the preceding decade and less than a quarter of the rate for the decade before that”).
30
See, e.g., ACR Electronics ResQLink+ Buoyant Personal Locator Beacon, WEST MARINE,
https://www.westmarine.com/buy/acr-electronics--resqlink-buoyant-personal-locator-beacon-13381207 [https://perma.cc/28A7-ZWEA] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (serving as an example of the
advent of cheap and lightweight personal locators that are available to recreational sailors); Alexis C.
Madrigal, More Than 90% of Adult Americans Have Cell Phones, ATLANTIC (Jun. 6, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/06/more-than-90-of-adult-americans-have-cellphones/276615/ [https://perma.cc/YDP7-2PTW] (showing that, as of 2013, 91% of adults in America
owned a cell phone). The advent of cheap personal locators and the ubiquity of cell phones strongly
indicate that a distressed sailor has the ability to call authorities, friends, or contracted parties for
assistance instead of relying on the assistance of passersby, as is contemplated by salvage law.
31
See Tom Burden, Do-it-Yourself: Safety Equipment, WEST MARINE (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.westmarine.com/WestAdvisor/DIY-Safety-Equipment
[https://perma.cc/JZ3D-YWF9]
(listing safety requirements for recreational boats promulgated by the United States Coast Guard as well
as private safety recommendations).
32
See U.S. COAST GUARD NAVIGATION CTR., RADIO INFORMATION FOR BOATERS,
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=mtBoater [https://perma.cc/UC2N-VNL6] (last updated Sept.
15, 2016) (discussing how the widespread adoption of VHF marine radios allows for constant
communication between vessels at sea and emergency services on shore). Additionally, Digital Selective
Calling (DSC) and the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) service allow for a level of
communication equivalent to on-shore telephone usage. See U.S. COAST GUARD NAVIGATION CTR.,
SELECTIVE
CALLING,
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AboutDSC
DIGITAL
[https://perma.cc/6M73-SG4R] (detailing the uses and history of the DSC system).
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and cost efficient, measures what then are the policies justifying the
continued existence of salvage law? One potential reason that has only
recently been developed is that salvage awards help protect the maritime
environment.33 Proponents argue that a ship is unlikely to be saved if it is
more economical to leave the vessel where it is, resulting in damage to the
surrounding marine environment.34 While this is a proper, and laudable,
goal, it should not be justification for the continuance of the practice of
liberal salvage awards in the context of recreational vessels. The kind of
harm contemplated by these awards is that which comes from large
commercial tankers filled with harmful chemicals, not average recreational
vessels, which are almost all under twenty-six feet in length.35
II.

THE MODERN LAW OF MARITIME SALVAGE

A. Development of Salvage Awards in America
1. Salvage Awards in the Courts
As noted above, American courts have recognized salvage awards since
the inception of the American legal system.36 Salvage awards occupy a
nearly unique legal niche and are treated both as compensation and reward.
Because salvage awards have their origin in a public policy of encouraging
seafarers to not just save property but restore it to its rightful owner, and as
a corollary to reduce piracy, the amount awarded is unique in that it has
essentially no relationship to the amount of work or time put in by the
salvor.37 Consequently, in order to ensure that seafarers are willing to take
the risks necessary to assist distressed ships and to ensure that the property
is returned to the rightful owners, salvage awards need to be “liberal.”38
There are six factors a court considers in determining the amount of a
salvage award, originally spelled out by Justice Clifford in The Blackwall.
The Second Circuit listed them in order of descending importance:
33

Anderson, supra note 22, at 229.
See id. (noting that a salvor is unlikely to “expend time and money on salving a vessel with little
hope of receiving a reward”).
35
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. COAST GUARD, 2014 RECREATIONAL BOATING
STATISTICS 69 tbl. 37 (2014), https://www.uscgboating.org/library/accident-statistics/RecreationalBoating-Statistics-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7FM-5KDM].
36
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining how salvage awards have been recognized
since the country’s founding).
37
Anderson, supra note 22, at 228; see also Seaman v. Tank Barge OC601, 325 F. Supp 1206, 1209
(S.D. Ala. 1971) (awarding a salvor $7553 for towing a distressed boat twenty-five miles and, in part,
justifying such a large reward by stating that “it is unquestioned that salvage awards are not quantum
meruit, but are rewards for seamen who voluntarily act to rescue life and property from the perils of the
sea”); Girard v. The M/Y Quality Time, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (awarding $16,896.05
for four hours of salvage involving neither “unusual risks” nor the use of “special skills or equipment”).
38
Seaman, 325 F. Supp. at 1209.
34
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i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Degree of danger from which the property was rescued;
Value of the property saved;
Risk incurred in saving the property from the impending peril;
Value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the
service, and the danger to which it was exposed;
v.
Promptitude and skill displayed;
vi.
Labor expended in rendering the salvage service.39
Courts have also considered the “dangers presented by the situation that
might have foreseeably developed but or the actions of the salvors” in
determining the salvage award.40
In the modern context, these Blackwall factors are used to demarcate
whether or not a salvage is considered low order, medium order, or high
order.41 Low order salvage is salvage that involves a low degree of peril,
minimal effort or time investment, and no special expertise on the part of the
salvor.42 Low order salvage can be the most frustrating type of salvage for a
recreational vessel owner, because it often looks like nothing more than a
simple towage and requires only that a salvor acts promptly and
successfully.43 Low order salvage awards range between 1% and 10% of the
value of the salvaged property; this can lead to salvage awards, for example,
in excess of $7,000 for a few minutes’ worth of work,44 which perfectly
exemplifies why salvage awards in the recreational boating context are
inappropriate.
Medium order salvage is distinct from towing and often requires greater
risk to the salvor, a large expenditure of time and effort, and can require
specialized skill or equipment on the part of the salvor.45 Medium order
salvage awards range from 11% to 19% of the value of the salvaged
property. While it is often more palatable to the vessel owner than low order
salvage because the danger is more readily visible, the fact that the danger
need only be reasonably apprehended by the salvor leads to situations where
an award of $85,000 is granted when there is a dispute over whether or not
the vessel was in any actual danger of sinking.46
Finally, high order salvage is generally typified by the high degree of
peril that the salvor must subject themselves to in order to perform the
39
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1870); see also B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702 F.2d
333, 339 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying the Blackwall factors); Ocean Servs. Towing & Salvage v. Brown, 810
F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (also applying Blackwall’s factors); Brown v. Johansen, 881 F.2d
107, 109 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Blackwall’s factors, as well).
40
Anderson, supra note 22, at 226.
41
Vickey L. Quinn, Hard Aground: A Primer on the Salvage of Recreational Vessels, 19 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 321, 349 (2007).
42
Id. at 350–52.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 355.
45
Quinn, supra note 41, at 355.
46
Id. at 358–59.
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salvage. ; as a consequence of that peril, high order salvage awards can be
anywhere from 20% to 100% of the value of the salvaged property.47 High
order salvage situations would seem, on their face, to be the exact situations
contemplated by courts when they attempt to justify the liberal nature of
salvage awards, and to be sure, they are the situations that the law of salvage
initially intended to mitigate. The problem that arises, however, in the
context of recreational boating is two-fold: first, these situations are the most
susceptible to abuse by predatory salvors, as the vessel owner is under
extreme duress; and second, these situations are almost always emergencies
attended to by the Coast Guard, which plays a major role in the rescue and
salvage of such vessels.
In the years since Blackwall, both international and American courts
have recognized other factors that can impact the value of the salvage award
granted to the salvor. Beginning in 1980, the LOF provided that, contrary to
the no-cure-no-pay basis, a salvor who failed in an attempt to salve a “tanker
laden or partly laden with a cargo of oil” would be awarded expenses plus
15% as a reward for attempting to mitigate damage to the environment.48 In
1989, the International Convention on Salvage was held and ratified by the
United States in 1990, further providing that any salvor could receive his
expenses and up to 200% of that value as a reward for efforts “to prevent or
mitigate damage to the environment.”49 While an ultimately laudable goal,
the Convention contemplated the environmental harm of a large scale loss
of toxic cargo at sea, not the relatively small and harmless dangers posed by
distressed recreational vessels.50
Ultimately, the public policies pursued by the courts in granting liberal
salvage awards have a disproportionate and harmful effect on recreational
vessel owners. Since salvage was traditionally performed by someone who
can be best compared to the good Samaritan of yore,51 courts were concerned
with not only properly rewarding such passersby, but encouraging
everybody on the sea to assist anyone they saw to be in danger. The rise of
both recreational vessels and the professional salvor, however, has brought
to the surface the inherent problem with applying the traditionally liberal
view of salvage awards to the “salvage” of recreational vessels.

47

Id. at 359.
Anderson, supra note 22, at 229.
49
Id.
50
Nicholas J.J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and the Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF) Salvage
Agreement 1990, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 6 (1991).
51
To be sure, courts have, from their earliest point, recognized that professional salvors exist, but
the underlying public policy reasons for salvage awards is contemplative of the Good Samaritan. See The
Lamington, 86 F. 675, 684 (2d Cir. 1898) (discussing that professional salvors are entitled to the same
liberal awards as a more traditional salvor).
48
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2. Salvage Awards in Arbitration
The liberal awards granted by the court system in England scared vessel
owners and their insurers and as such, the initial purpose of arbitration in
salvage award disputes was motivated by the protection of vessel owners
and their insurers from what they saw as unfair and extravagant awards.52
Over time, as the LOF contract gained international acceptance and the
arbiters at Lloyd’s became known for their knowledgeable decisions,
arbitration became the primary means of settling disputes. This translated to
modern salvage disputes as the number of professional salvors and
recreational vessel owners increased, however at this point, actual arbitration
in England rarely happened and the LOF was used more as a standard from
which to operate.53 The threat of arbitration in a foreign court and the fight
between vessel owners, salvors, and insurers demonstrates the confused state
of salvage awards in the recreational context, and in order to understand that,
we must look at the development of arbitration in American jurisprudence.
In early American jurisprudence, arbitration of salvage awards
frequently occurred alongside litigation.54 Before American courts became
concretely established, while the states were still being consolidated and
jurisprudence was young, there was often confusion about how and where
disputes would be settled. In the salvage context, this often resulted in
arbitration being the de facto and primary method of settling disputes.55 With
the arrival of LOF contract salvage in 1890 and the establishment of LOF as
the international gold standard for salvage dispute resolution, arbitration in
the United States was replaced and almost completely faded away.56 Despite
efforts by the United States to encourage domestic arbitration,57 the LOF
remained the gold standard for dispute resolution, and the majority of
arbitrations took place before a Committee at Lloyd’s. That changed,
however, in 1992, with a seemingly innocuous case: Brier v. Northstar
Marine, Inc.58

52
See INTERNATIONAL SALVAGE UNION, THE ORIGINS OF LLOYD’S FORM, http://www.marinesalvage.com/overview/the-origins-of-lloyds-form/ [https://perma.cc/M8UC-LS5R] (discussing the
origins and importance of the Lloyd’s Open Form as a response to complaints surrounding the
unreasonable and coercive acts by salvors).
53
See Anderson, supra note 22, at 222 (noting that the increase of recreational vessel owners and
the influx of new insurance carriers prompted an increased skepticism of the use of the LOF).
54
See Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 257.
55
See Randy W. Miller, The Case of the Brig Halcyon: A Study in Old Key West Admiralty Law,
27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 311, 316, 320 (1996) (discussing how arbitration had become common place in
larger urban areas and how it eventually became the primary method of settling disputes in Florida).
56
See Parks, supra note 19, at 1486 (noting that in 1923, there were only fourteen reported salvage
arbitrations in the entire United States).
57
See generally id. (discussing the rise, fall, and rise again of arbitration in the United States).
58
Brier v. Northstar Marine, 1993 A.M.C. 1194, 1211 (D.N.J. 1992).
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In Brier, a case before the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, the vessel owner’s insurance company argued that the LOF
contract was unenforceable for a number of reasons.59 The court rejected
most of the plaintiff’s arguments, but found for the plaintiff and held that a
LOF contract was invalid because it violated the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).60 The court held that the FAA ordinarily prohibits a court from
ordering arbitration outside its own district, and that where such a court may
order arbitration in a foreign nation, one of the parties must not be an
American citizen or the underlying dispute must have some relationship to
the foreign nation, in this instance, England.61
The court’s ruling in Brier, in effect, sounded something of a death knell
for the enforcement of a LOF contract as the central arbitration provision
was found to be invalid.62 While a number of district courts have followed
this decision, not every district has adopted the Brier court’s approach,
therefore, the LOF contract still has some life left in it, but has largely fallen
out of favor.63
With the arbitration clause of the LOF contract now functionally
worthless, a number of American maritime arbitration societies have
attempted to promulgate a new standard for arbitration. The three main
organizations that occupy the hole left by the absence of the LOF contract
are the Society of Maritime Arbitrators (SMA), the Miami Maritime
Arbitration Council (MMAC), and the Boat Owners Association of The
United States (BOATUS).64 In order to get a comprehensive view of how
arbitration impacts the amount granted for a salvage award, it is important
to look at how each organization has attempted to fill the gap left by Lloyd’s.
The SMA was founded in 1963 and was, at the time of the Brier
decision, considered the premier maritime arbitration organization in
America, despite the fact that it had rarely, if ever, been involved in actual
arbitration of disputes.65 After Brier, the SMA promulgated a document that
sought to duplicate the LOF as closely as possible for use in the U.S., which
59
See id. at 1195 (discussing plaintiff’s arguments that the LOF contract was invalid because it “is
a contract of adhesion,” it was entered into under fraud and duress, and that such arbitration violated the
Federal Arbitration Act).
60
Id. at 1211.
61
Id. at 1203.
62
Id. at 1211.
63
See Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport N.Y., 828 F. Supp. 1002, 1015–16 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(enforcing the arbitration clause of the LOF contract and rejecting the idea that a LOF contract violates
the FAA when both parties are American citizens and there is no connection, other than the LOF contract,
to England), rev’d, 30 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Reinholtz v. Retriever Marine Towing & Salvage,
1994 A.M.C. 2981, 2989 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (following Brier and holding that the arbitration clause in a
LOF contract was unenforceable where there was otherwise no connection to England in the underlying
dispute).
64
Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 260.
65
Id.
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66

it called MARSALV. The MARSALV document provides one innovation
over the LOF that deserves mention: the so-called “Small Vessel Rules,”
which allow for an expedited process in the context of recreational vessels.67
The MMAC was founded in 1986 and was created as an alternative to
the LOF, but occupied much the same territory as the SMA. The MMAC’s
LOF alternative was termed the SALCON 89 and was substantially similar
to both the LOF and MARSALV, but differed in that it was more closely
tied to the 1989 Salvage Convention.68 In most respects, the MMAC
conducts arbitration in much the same manner as the SMA, except that the
MMAC provides more security to salvors69 and the final rulings are
confidential, unlike both the SMA and BOATUS awards, which are publicly
available.70
BOATUS occupies a unique place apart from the SMA and the MMAC
in that it began as an association of recreational boat owners, instead of as a
society purely for the arbitration of salvage disputes. While the BOATUS
arbitration process is, again, substantially similar to both the SMA and
MMAC processes, it does provide a bit more protection to the boat owner in
that arbitration costs are more limited and are split between parties, and the
list of approved arbitrators is substantially more restrictive, generally only
consisting of marine professionals and admiralty attorneys.71
B. Elements of Pure Salvage
The Sabine72 is the seminal Supreme Court case on the current iteration
of salvage law in the United States. The Court defined salvage as “the
compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance a ship at
sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from impending
sea peril, or in recovering such property from actual peril or loss, as in cases
of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture.”73 The Court went on to articulate the
three elements required for a valid salvage claim: “1. A marine peril. 2.
Service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from

66
The document was a copy of the LOF in all but name. It allowed for four types of compensation:
(1) no-cure-no-pay; (2) fixed amount; (3) hourly rate; and (4) another form of compensation agreed upon
by both parties. The form also allowed compensation for minimizing environmental damage and
provided that all disputes would be heard before a committee at the SMA. Id. at 260–261.
67
It should be noted, however, that the process is still carried out in accordance with U.S. maritime
law regarding salvage awards and carries with it all the problems discussed in this Note.
68
Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 262.
69
It allowed for the salvor to demand security equal to 150% of the salvage claim. Id. at 262–63.
70
Id. at 263.
71
Id. at 264–65.
72
101 U.S. 384 (1879).
73
Id. at 384.
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a special contract. 3. Success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered
contributed to such success.”74
1. Actual Danger
The “marine peril”75 articulated by the Supreme Court in The Sabine has
had a tumultuous history; it is a very fact-sensitive consideration on which
courts often take a very liberal view.76 Courts that have addressed the issue
of marine peril have found the dispositive question to be not whether the
peril was imminent, but rather “whether it [was] ‘reasonably to be
apprehended.’”77 To make the definition even broader, courts have held that
the peril contemplated by the salvor does not even need to be a peril that the
imperiled vessel could not have solved on its own; a salvor can be awarded
a large sum of money for “saving” a ship that did not need to be saved.78
In holding that a salvage claim is appropriate not only when there is
actual danger to a vessel but also when such danger is “reasonab[ly]
apprehen[ded],” courts have allowed for a dangerously wide range of
circumstances in which salvage claims can be awarded.79 Claims have been
found where a vessel had run aground on a rocky ledge,80 was adrift with no
power near the coast,81 was still at the dock but was near a fire,82 and where
the vessel itself was otherwise fine, but the crew was incapacitated.83 Despite
the very generous definition courts have afforded to the word “peril,” they
74

Id.
Id.
76
See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 42–43 (1801) (holding that peril need not be
“inevitably certain” but rather that the danger should be “real and imminent”). It is worth noting that the
Sabine was in seemingly serious danger. The ship had been grounded on a hidden obstruction. “Many of
her flooring timbers and bottom planks were broken, and . . . she had in her hold sixteen to eighteen
inches of water . . . .” Sabine, 101 U.S. at 385.
77
Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1968); see also
Girard v. M/V Blacksheep, 840 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a salvor need not show
that their salvage actions were necessary to save the ailing vessel); Evanow v. M/V Neptune, 163 F.3d
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a vessel is in peril when it is exposed to “any actual or
apprehended danger which might result in her destruction”); B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States,
702 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that peril will be found where there is a “reasonable
apprehension of injury or destruction if the services are not rendered”). For a slightly narrower view of
what constitutes marine peril, see Faneuil Advisors Inc. v. O/S Sea Hawk, 50 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that although the peril need not be immediate, it must be “something more than the inevitable
deterioration that any vessel left untended would suffer”).
78
Girard, 840 F.3d at 1354 (noting that it is a “mistaken notion that . . . salvors . . . must prove that
their actions were necessary to eliminate [peril]” (citing Legnos v. M/V Olga Jacob, 498 F.2d 666, 671
(5th Cir. 1974))).
79
Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d at 338.
80
Id. at 335, 342.
81
H.R.M., Inc. v. S/V Eagle Light, 1997 A.M.C. 1972, 1974 (D. Conn. 1997).
82
Murray v. The John Swan, 50 F. 447, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1892).
83
Williamson v. The Alphonso, 30 F. Cas. 4, 5 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853).
75
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have not allowed salvage claims for every mishap that involves a vessel on
navigable waters.84
The case law showcases that courts can construe peril broadly, liberally,
and often times in contradiction to the plain meaning of the word.
Furthermore, because peril is not only an essential element required for a
salvor to bring a claim, but also one of the defining factors in determining
how large the salvage award is going to be,85 there is often a great deal of
confusion on the part of recreational sailors and those inexperienced in
maritime salvage.86 This confusion will often lead to inexperienced sailors,
whose vessels have stalled or run aground, agreeing to what they consider
towing services, which turn out to be much more expensive salvage
services.87
2. Voluntariness and No Prior Duty
Voluntariness has been an integral part of a salvage claim dating back
to its first recorded appearance in Roman law.88 In the Supreme Court’s early
jurisprudence, salvage claims take on a somewhat noble cast and are set
distinctly apart from being a mere reward for work done. In The Blackwall,
Justice Clifford waxed poetic about the policy justifications for salvage,
stating:
Compensation as salvage is not viewed by the admiralty courts
merely as pay, on the principle of a quantum meruit, or as a
remuneration pro opera et labore, but as a reward given for
perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement
to seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to save
life and property.89
While the contemporary view of salvage may be less poetic, the concept that
salvage is a reward for services offered voluntarily has persevered.
In determining whether the voluntariness element has been met, courts
primarily look at whether the salvor had a preexisting legal obligation to
84
See Clifford v. M/V Islander, 751 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that there was no peril where
a vessel had a substantial hole in the hull but was otherwise secured and not sinking); Phelan v. Minges,
170 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1959) (holding that there was no peril where a boat had drifted out to
sea during a storm but had come to rest in calm waters); The Viola, 52 F. 172, 173 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1892),
aff’d, 55 F. 829 (3d Cir. 1893) (holding that there was no peril where a vessel was adrift but could have
returned to port once weather had cleared).
85
See cases cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86
Liscio, supra note 5.
87
See NORRIS, supra note 6, at 25 (“A salvage service is a service voluntarily rendered to a vessel
or other marine property in need of assistance . . . . A simple towage service is one which is rendered for
the mere purpose of expediting . . . voyage, without reference to any circumstances of danger.”);
discussion infra Part II.D.
88
NORRIS, supra note 6, at 7.
89
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869).
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assist the distressed vessel in “relieving property from an impending peril at
sea.”90 Where such a preexisting contract is found for salvage services, the
voluntariness is negated and the salvor’s award is limited to the terms of the
contract.91 It must be noted, however, that the contract must be express and
clearly preexisting in order to negate voluntariness; “[t]he fact that a
shipowner requests a salvage service and that the salvors in response furnish
it, standing alone, does not create an implied contract so as to defeat a
salvage claim.”92 The concept that a preexisting contract will void the
voluntariness requirement is further weakened by the fact that where a
contractor acts beyond the terms of the contract, those actions can be
considered voluntary and the salvor may be entitled to a salvage award.93
The noble ideal that salvage awards serve to compensate the heroic
passersby who risk life and limb to help a distressed vessel is further
tarnished by the fact that courts have held that the motive of the salvor is
immaterial; any salvor without a preexisting obligation, whether they are
working for “monetary gain, humanitarian purposes or merely error,” will
be considered voluntary.94 There can be considerable confusion and
contention—particularly in the recreational sailing context where people are
less familiar with maritime law––over whether salvage services are
voluntarily offered. Because there is such an ill-defined distinction between
towage and salvage services, many distressed sailors have found themselves
having to defend against an expensive salvage claim for work they believed
to be covered by a preexisting towage contract.95 The burden on recreational
sailors, who are likely encountering the concept of salvage for the first time
while their boat is distressed and they are dealing with well-versed and often
predatory salvors,96 is magnified by the fact that it is the defendant who bears
the burden of proving that there was a preexisting contract for salvage.97
Something which they may find difficult to do, given what they thought was
an inclusive services package will likely turn out to be for limited towage
services.
90

In re Petition of Sun Oil Co., 342 F. Supp. 976, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 474 F.2d 1048 (2d
Cir. 1973).
91
See Flagship Marine Servs. v. Belcher Towing Co., 966 F.2d 602, 605 (11th Cir. 1992)
(“[N]othing short of a contract to pay a given sum for the services to be rendered, or a binding
engagement to pay at all events . . . will operate as a bar to a meritorious claim for salvage.” (quoting
The Camanche, 75 U.S. 448, 477 (1869))).
92
See id. (quoting Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th
Cir. 1968)).
93
Camanche, 75 U.S. at 477–78; Sobonis v. Steam Tanker Nat’l Def., 298 F. Supp. 631, 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Smith v. Union Oil, 274 F. Supp. 248, 250–51 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
94
Quinn, supra note 41, at 337.
95
See supra notes 5, 72–79.
96
Liscio, supra note 5.
97
Clifford v. M/V Islander, 751 F.2d 1, 5 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984).
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A final problem with the no prior duty aspect of salvage is that many of
the major professional salvage organizations also advertise that they offer
free towage services with membership or they advertise towing insurance at
a low rate.98 So, a common occurrence is for a recreational vessel owner to
have a towage contract with a major corporation, such as BOATUS or Sea
Tow, and to call upon them when they are in a situation that is justifiably
believed to be within the advertised sphere of the contract, only to be stuck
with a bill for thousands of dollars.
3. Success of Salvage
The fact that a successful salvage of some amount of either the vessel or
the cargo is a necessary element of a salvage claim might seem to conflict
with the driving principle behind maritime salvage: that it serves as a method
to reward good Samaritans who risk themselves to help others. It follows
that if the public policy giving rise to a salvage claim is that people should
be encouraged to assist seafarers who are in trouble, then the reward should
not depend on whether or not the salvaging was successful. The reason
underlying the requirement for success, however, is fairly simple: the
salvage award is based on a percentage value of the vessel and cargo saved
by the salvor, or more commonly in modern times, a lien placed on the
property.
In an attempt to promote the salvage of vessels perceived to have zero
value, and thus not be subject to a claim for pure salvage, the LOF was
revised in 1980 to provide an unsuccessful salvor with his expenses plus an
additional 15% as a reward.99 Furthermore, the International Convention on
Salvage, which was adopted by the United States in 1990, included a
provision that entitled a salvor to his expenses plus up to an additional 200%
as a reward for an “unsuccessful” salvage that would “prevent or mitigate
damage to the environment.”100 Such provisions have been adopted as
measures to encourage environmental protection at all levels of maritime
commerce.101

98
See Membership, BOATUS, https://www.boatus.com/towing/ [https://perma.cc/2BTK-VUCS]
(last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (offering unlimited freshwater towing for $72 per year and unlimited saltwater
towing for $149 per year); Membership, SEATOW, https://www.seatow.com/membership/
[https://perma.cc/QAL5-YSCD] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (offering 100%, nationwide coverage for
“towing, jump starts, fuel drops, prop disentanglements & covered ungroundings”).
99
Anderson, supra note 22, at 229.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 230 (noting that this shifts the cost of environmental protection from the public to the
owner of the vessel and encourages salvors to pursue seemingly “worthless” jobs in order to protect the
environment). Vessel owners are encouraged to take precautionary measures so they are not responsible
for a costly recovery of valueless property and salvors are encouraged to salvage wrecks that are
damaging to the environment but would not otherwise be subject to a pure salvage claim. Id.
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C. Contract Salvage
At its core, contract salvage is the preexisting contract discussed above
that negates the voluntariness element of a pure salvage claim. Where there
is a preexisting obligation, contractual or otherwise, for a person to render
salvage services for a fixed fee regardless of success, contract salvage is
found.102 Salvage would seemingly be separated into two clear and distinct
categories: one where there is a preexisting agreement and the terms of the
service and award are dictated by a contract, and another where there is no
such agreement and the salvor is merely helping on a whim. The distinction
is not so clear-cut, however, much to the dismay of many desperate and
distraught recreational sailors.
Contract salvage stands as one of the biggest issues for recreational
vessels and poses the greatest risk to distraught and uninformed sailors,
subjecting them to opportunistic and often predatory salvors. Confounding,
infuriating, and often expensive to the inexperienced is the nearly
inexplicable concept that “[n]ot every salvage contract results in contract
salvage.”103 While contract salvage is traditionally demarcated by a prenegotiated instrument, when there is a dire situation a contract for salvage
services can be presented by a salvor to the owner of the vessel on a
“no-cure-no-pay” basis. Such salvage is almost exclusively based on the
LOF and, despite the fact that there is a contract involved, is considered a
pure salvage service.104
Such ad hoc contracts mostly serve the purposes of large commercial or
industrial shipping; normally they are negotiated and signed prior to the start
of the salvage, and the use of standardized contracts is prevalent to facilitate
transactions.105 Such uniform no-cure-no-pay contracts allow for salvors to
help in situations that require immediate action where there is no time to
negotiate. However, recreational vessel owners have no seat at the table for
the negotiation, will not be repeat customers, are inexperienced in the
intricacies of maritime law, and are invariably in a situation of extreme
distress. A distraught person is handed a form and essentially told that in
order to receive help, he or she must sign on the dotted line.106 The most
disturbing aspect is the fact that the salvors are often companies with whom
the vessel owner has a preexisting towage contract, which the vessel owner
102

See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 196 (1898) (discussing contract salvage).
Anderson, supra note 22, at 219.
104
See Geoffrey Brice, The Law of Salvage: A Time for Change? “No Cure-No Pay” No Good?,
73 TUL. L. REV. 1831, 1832-1835 (1999) (discussing that both pure salvage and contact salvage deal with
the “no-cure-no-pay” concept and how under the no-cure-no-pay concept a salvor often enters into a
“financially abortive service”).
105
Quinn, supra note 41, at 340.
106
See Liscio supra note 5 (discussing the power a salvor has over a recreational boater in an
emergency situation).
103
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more than likely thinks is the nature of the paperwork which they are signing,
only to have a lien for upwards of 20% of the value of their vessel placed on
it.107
While these no-cure-no-pay contracts are nominally subject to the same
rules as any other contract108 and courts will “closely scrutinize[]”109 efforts
to create an agreement while the vessel is “in extremis,”110 there are few
cases in which a court has found an agreement with a recreational vessel to
be void because of misconduct by the salvor.111 Courts cling to definitions
and lines drawn up hundreds, if not thousands of years ago and are loathe to
deny a salvage claim that meets the very broad limits given to the elements.
D. Towing vs. Salvage
One of the biggest areas of confusion for inexperienced vessel owners
and thus an area of potential exploitation by opportunistic salvors, and one
of the most common arguments against a salvage claim, is that the services
rendered were towage services, not salvage services.112 As discussed above,
American jurisprudence treats salvage as a service “voluntarily rendered to
a vessel . . . in need of assistance,” whereas towage is a service “which is
rendered for the mere purpose of expediting her . . . voyage, without
reference to any circumstances of danger.”113 This definition often proves
unhelpful in practice, as a leading treatise has stated the act of rescuing a
ship at sea by towing her to a place of safety is the most basic form of
salvage.114
The one constant separating towage from salvage is that towage is
defined by the absence of peril, whereas salvage requires that there be some
peril to the vessel.115 While the motivation for salvage is ostensibly the safety
of the distressed vessel and other vessels at sea—although in practice,
contemplation of safety, or any actual danger, is often unimportant—the
motivation for towage is “convenience not safety.”116 Despite the nebulous
and often confused, line separating towage from salvage, the difference
107

Id. at 359.
See NORRIS, supra note 6, at 261 (describing how courts review salvage contracts).
109
The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 196 (1898).
110
Quinn, supra note 41, at 339.
111
See Anderson, supra note 22, at 221 (stating that a court “will set aside the contract if it finds
that the salvor took advantage of the situation to impose unconscionable or inequitable contract terms on
the vessel”).
112
See Liscio, supra note 5 (comparing the costs of towing and salvage services); Anderson, supra
note 22, at 211 (discussing how insurance companies often make such arguments because they are not
liable for towage services but are liable for salvage claims).
113
NORRIS, supra note 6, at 25.
114
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 446 (1957) (“The
prototypical act [of salvage] is rescuing a ship in peril at sea and towing her to a place of safety.”).
115
Anderson, supra note 22, at 212 (“The hallmark of ‘towage’ is the absence of peril.”).
116
Id.
108
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between the two can end up costing a vessel owner tens, if not hundreds of
thousands of dollars.117
Because the distinction between towage and salvage is one of such
profound importance, and yet is so poorly defined, recreational vessel
owners, who are very often inexperienced and at the mercy of an
experienced professional salvor, are confronted with a large salvage bill for
services that would seem like mere towage to anyone but the most seasoned
maritime lawyer.
III.

THE RISE OF SALVAGE OF RECREATIONAL VEHICLES

The Coast Guard traditionally performed rescue and salvage of
recreational vessels, and as such, professional salvage of recreational vessels
was not common. That is, however, until 1983 when the Coast Guard
announced that it would no longer provide salvage services to recreational
vessel owners and would instead rely on private salvage companies to meet
the needs of distressed recreational vessel owners.118 That change, combined
with the explosion in popularity of recreational sailing, the increasing
number of recreational vessels out at sea, the attendant increase in
inexperienced sailors, and the increased number of insurance carriers
entering the maritime field, resulted in the number of recreational vessels
subject to salvage awards skyrocketing in recent years.119[
IV.

WHY SALVAGE SHOULD BE REPLACED IN THE RECREATIONAL
BOATING CONTEXT

A. Predatory
To speak bluntly, the maritime doctrine of the liberal salvage award has
not caught up with the modern concept of recreational boating, and
unscrupulous salvage corporations take advantage of unassuming and
117

Since towing services are provided on a predetermined per-hour basis, but a salvage award is
determined by a myriad of factors, including the value of the salvaged vessel and the circumstances of
the salvage, a court finding for salvage could mean the difference between hundreds of dollars in towage
and hundreds of thousands of dollars in salvage. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. L & L Marine Serv.,
688 F. Supp. 502, 509 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (noting that a bill for towing services was $6,114.80 whereas the
award for salvage was determined to be $130,000 by arbitration); Ocean Servs. Towing & Salvage v.
Brown, 810 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (granting a salvage award of $8,000 for work that,
were it considered towing, would have been at most $625); Mahoney Marine Servs., v. Ellie Rose, 2002
A.M.C. 2838, 2840–42 (2002) (Cattell, Jr., Arb.) (awarding a salvor $15,600 for seven minutes of work
that would have been included with the $95 per year membership at no additional charge had “peril” not
been found).
118
Cattell, Jr., supra note 15, at 257; see also Anderson, supra note 22, at 205 (discussing the “large
number of small salvage companies [that] have sprung up across the country” in response to the Coast
Guard’s decision).
119
See supra note 1.
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unknowledgeable vessel owners by exploiting the complex legal definitions
surrounding towage, salvage, and salvage awards. The explosion of
recreational boating in the past several decades has introduced an
unprecedented number of vessel owners and insurance companies to the
complicated legal world of salvage awards, and they are potential targets for
exploitation by professional salvors. Professional salvors are benefited, and
recreational vessel owners are done a further disservice, when the Coast
Guard is called for assistance. This often forwards nonemergency distress
calls to professional salvors and lends them an air of legitimacy that they can
exploit for profit.120
It is perhaps easiest to see the predatory nature of the professional salvor
in the context of recreational boating by performing a brief case study of a
typical salvage award dispute. To that end, consider H.R.M., Inc. v. S/V
Eagle Light.121 H.R.M., also known as Safe Sea, is a large commercial
salvage company based out of Rhode Island that provides salvage and
towing services solely to recreational vessels.122 Safe Sea received radio
contact from the Eagle Light, a recreational vessel piloted by Dr. Murray,
after it had run aground while operating on auxiliary power at very slow
speeds.123 It is important to note that Dr. Murray had a preexisting towage
contract with a similar company called Sea Tow,124 but he contacted Safe
Sea because they were closer and could assist him more readily than Sea
Tow could.125
Safe Sea sent a vessel, the Kropp Salvor, to assist the Eagle Light, and
in short order it towed the Eagle Light off the strand on which it had
grounded with minimal expenditure of time, labor, and materials.126 Once
the vessel was ungrounded, the captain of the Kropp Salvor boarded the
Eagle Light and presented Dr. Murray with forms for signature that stated
services were successfully rendered. The lighting conditions were such that
the documents were functionally illegible, and there was no discussion of
the contents of the documents, which stated that the services were for pure
salvage and not towage, as Dr. Murray believed.127 There was no discussion
120

Peterson v. Allen, No. C07-1866, 2009 WL 666781, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2009).
1997 A.M.C. 1972 (D. Conn. 1997).
122
Id. at 1972. For an idea of how large and sophisticated this salvage operation is, note that the
company maintains six salvage vessels worth in excess of $400,000. Id.
123
Id. at 1974.
124
It is also noteworthy that many large maritime corporations, such as Safe Sea, Sea Tow, and
BOAT US, provide towing services, salvage services, and insurance services. The fact that a vessel owner
can have a towing services contract with a company, receive towing services from that same company,
and then be forced to pay a salvage award is indicative of the problem with the current state of salvage
awards and is a problem that is present in a large percentage of salvage award disputes.
125
Eagle Light, 1997 A.M.C. at 1974.
126
Id. at 1974.
127
Id. at 1974–75. Dr. Murray believed that he was receiving towage services at a rate of $127 per
hour, based on prior radio messages from Safe Sea. Id.
121
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of the type of service or cost prior to the rendering of services, and when Dr.
Murray offered to pay at the scene, he was refused and the salvage company
stated that it only wanted the name of his insurance carrier.128 Ultimately,
Safe Sea sought a salvage award of $12,100, plus 18% interest, from Dr.
Murray’s insurance carrier for the monumental task of towing the Eagle
Light “a few hundred feet from shore,” despite the fact that the passengers
were not in any danger and could even have walked ashore if need be.129
This type of interaction is typical of how large commercial salvage
operations prey on unknowing and distraught vessel owners in high-stress
situations.130 By providing for such high salvage awards, the current state of
the law encourages salvage companies to be predatory and take advantage
of the inexperience of recreational vessel owners by presenting them with
complicated and often unintelligible documents that could turn an otherwise
basic tow into a salvage that costs upwards of 20% of the value of the
salvaged vessel. Far from its roots of encouraging the assistance of
distressed sailors, the current state of salvage law encourages salvors to
delay assistance until a vessel is in more distress. Instead of encouraging
professional mariners to help each other in times of trouble, it now
encourages professional salvors to take advantage of inexperienced vessel
owners. In the context of recreational vessels, liberal salvage awards
accomplish none of the public policies that purportedly justify their
existence. Instead, they force unsuspecting vessel owners to fund the
misdeeds of unscrupulous salvors and now have the opposite of the
anti-piracy effect intended by their inception.
B. Public Policy
It is a well-known rule of contract law that one who assents to a writing
is presumed to know its contents and cannot void the contract by arguing
that she did not read them.131 While this ostensibly holds true in the context
128

Id. at 1975.
Id. Safe Sea was ultimately awarded $9,000 by the court. Id. at 1977.
130
See Stevenson v. October Princess Holdings, LLC, SMA No. 3982, 2007 WL 5911098, at *1–2
(N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007) (Busch, Farrell, Jr., & Carroll, Arbs.) (finding that the services rendered were towing
and denying a requested salvage award of $237,300 where a yacht was stranded due to high tide and the
owner initially refused assistance; after learning that the salvor was affiliated with BOAT US, with whom
the owner had a towing agreement, the owner accepted assistance and was towed to safety, whereupon
he signed what was believed to be a receipt for towing services); Sea Tow Servs. Cape Cod Bay v. Baer,
SMA No. 3405, 1998 WL 35281239, at *4 (N.Y. Jan. 5, 1998) (Carroll, Arb.) (discussing a salvage in
which the owner did not agree to a salvage and was deceived by a salvor from whom he intended to
receive towing services); Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY, 30 F.3d 360, 362 (2d Cir. 1994) (detailing
facts wherein a salvor neglected to explain arbitration provisions, and when confronted with a vessel
owner who had trouble reading and wanted to consult an attorney, stated he “would be unable to render
assistance without a signed contract” in an emergency situation; the salvor further implied that the
owner’s towing insurance would cover the cost of services).
131
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of salvage law, the stresses and pressures that are inherent to any situation
in which salvage would be required, that is to say where there is marine peril,
should be viewed in a light more favorable to the distressed party. As
discussed above, the situations in which no-cure-no-pay salvage contracts
are signed are invariably ones of high stress in which the vessel owners are
often unable to read or comprehend the documents that are being pressed
upon them by salvors.132 Public policy, and the protection of consumers and
vessel owners, is best served by placing a greater amount of scrutiny on
no-cure-no-pay contracts entered into by salvors and recreational vessel
owners.
American courts have recognized that situations involving salvage are
inherently dangerous, and the courts have stated that since vessel owners are
in a heightened state of vulnerability to fraud and duress in such
circumstances, the law of salvage “cannot . . . tolerate . . . dishonesty,
corruption, fraud, [or] falsehood, either in the rendering [of] service, or in
[the] proceedings to recover the salvage.”133 Despite this paternalistic
instinct, there are very few cases in which a salvage agreement involving a
recreational vessel has been found void due to duress, fraud, or coercion. 134
The seminal cases regarding salvage law all contemplate informed and
equally-matched commercial vessels interacting with one another, and the
concept of duress outlined in The Elfrida.135 This precedent, still followed
by courts today, is too narrow and does not adequately account for the
recreational boating context.
Setting aside the notion that allowing for liberal salvage awards in the
recreational boating context promotes behavior contrary to public policy, it
is clear that the policy reasons that originally justified such awards are not
applicable to recreational vessels.136 The current state of maritime navigation
is such that a recreational vessel owner is not in as perilous a situation as
was his commercial counterpart in the 1800s.137 The original policy reasons
no longer hold sway, and salvage law must pivot in order to accommodate
modern public policy concerns such as consumer protection, reducing
transaction costs, and ensuring that businesses act scrupulously—all of
132
See Jones, 30 F.3d at 362 (detailing a situation in which vessel owners were pressured by a
salvor into signing a document which they could not read, due to a lack of glasses and poor lighting, or
comprehend; the salvor informed them they would be stranded if they did not sign); Black Gold Marine,
Inc. v. Jackson Marine Co., 759 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (detailing a situation in which a vessel
captain, who had never seen a salvage document before and who could not understand the language used,
was pressured into signing through false assurances by the salvor).
133
Church v. Seventeen Hundred and Twelve Dollars, 5 F. Cas. 669, 672 (S.D. Fla. 1853).
134
Anderson, supra note 22, at 221.
135
See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 197 (1898) (setting a standard for duress that contemplated that
the vessel had an experienced “Master” and a sophisticated and informed commercial vessel owner).
136
See supra Part II.
137
See Bloor, supra note 29.
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which are contravened in a recreational context by the current state of
salvage law.
C. Technology and Alternatives
As discussed above in Part II, the rise of modern technology and the
evolution of recreational boating from a solitary activity to a
community-based activity have all but eliminated the concerns that salvage
law addresses.138 Disregarding, for the moment, that a sailor is now orders
of magnitude less likely to be injured while at sea,139 technological
advancements and alternative avenues of assistance have obviated the need
to incentivize would-be salvors with such obscene awards in the recreational
vessel context. The ubiquity of communications devices, the pervasiveness
of on-board GPS and maritime radio, and the increased availability of
personal locators all mean that average seafarers are increasingly unlikely to
find themselves in a situation that requires actual salvage as opposed to
towage.140
While the rise of the professional salvor has been at the expense of, and
a detriment to, the recreational vessel owner, it has shown that there is an
industry ready to provide for the needs of the distressed recreational vessel
owner. It has also shown that the incentive intended by salvage awards is no
longer necessary and serves only to allow predatory salvage practices.
Furthermore, while the memberships offered by organizations like Sea Tow
and BOATUS are often misleading and play a large role in the predatory
practices that typify the actions of salvage companies, they could be a valid
alternative, similar to AAA, and their popularity stands as a testament to the
idea that such memberships are valued and are a sustainable business
model.141
V.

REPLACEMENTS FOR SALVAGE LAW

It is all well and good to recognize that the application of salvage law in
the context of recreational vessels no longer serves the public policies that
originally underlined the existence of a liberal salvage award and that such
a liberal award serves only to encourage predatory practices by professional
salvors. But such recognition is pointless without taking steps to eliminate
138

See supra Part II.
Bloor, supra note 29.
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See supra notes 29–32 (noting improvements in maritime technology and safety).
141
See Pete McDonald, On Board With: Capt. Joe Frohnhoefer, Founder of Sea Tow, BOATING
MAG, Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.boatingmag.com/how-to/board-capt-joe-frohnhoefer-founder-sea-tow
[https://perma.cc/SAZ5-Z7RT] (noting that Sea Tow had 200,000 members as of 2013); Press Release,
BoatUS,
Boat Owners Association of The US: By the Numbers (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.boatus.com/pressroom/release.asp?id=985 [https://perma.cc/2D2H-RDB3] (noting that
BoatUS had 500,000 members as of 2013).
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salvage awards and replace them with a viable, more easily comprehended
alternative.
The most obvious replacement for the capriciously liberal salvage
awards currently turned out by arbitrators and judges alike is to turn all
salvage awards, whether based on pure or contract salvage, into a purely
quantum meruit determination and eliminate the complicated factors that
first appeared in The Blackwall.142 Although salvage awards were originally
intended as “a reward given for perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and
as an inducement to seamen and others to embark in such undertakings to
save life and property,”143 such high-minded ideals no longer hold any sway
in the realm of professional salvage. In the context of recreational vessels,
these justifications no longer hold true as there is little to no peril in assisting
a distraught vessel owner with a boat that has run aground,144 a ship that has
drifted a few miles from shore,145 or a yacht that sits in the marina taking on
water.146 Modern day professional salvors work a job like any other and
should be paid pro opera et labore and not based on an antiquated test
seeking to reward a maritime good Samaritan. Therefore, it makes the most
sense to do away with salvage awards and create a standardized salvage
agreement that provides for a default contract that sets a price for the salvage
based on the time and materials expended by the salvor.147
A similar alternative to the current state of salvage awards, if the legal
fiction of a contract is untenable, would be to treat a salvor the same way the
law treats a doctor who furnishes aid on a distressed person she may happen
upon.148 A physician may “recover on a quantum meruit basis for the
reasonable value of services rendered and materials furnished, in lieu of
contract.”149 As noted supra in Part III, salvage law occupies a unique niche
in law whereby it is a restitution that is not determined by the amount of time
or effort expended by the salvor.150 Courts have ostensibly justified this by
pointing to the emergency circumstances that surround a salvage operation
and how salvage awards are intended to motivate salvors to assist in times
of danger. The same policy reasons, however, also underlie the allowance of
quantum meruit restitution in instances of a physician providing emergency
142

See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1869) (discussing the circumstances that determine
compensation for salvage).
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Id. at 14.
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Mahoney Marine Servs., v. Ellie Rose, 2002 A.M.C. 2838, 2842 (2002) (Cattell, Jr., Arb.).
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Phelen v. Minges, 170 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1959).
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147
It is important that this be a default and not a mandatory price setting. The law cannot expect
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other business setting.
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services to a person with whom they have no prior contractual
relationship.151 There is no discernable reason to treat salvage specially and
as deserving of a higher reward than the quantum meruit restitution owed a
physician who renders life-saving assistance in an emergency; the two
situations mirror each other very closely, except one happens at sea and the
other generally happens on land.152
One final alternative could be to place the burden of salvage awards on
insurance companies and require, just as is required for the operation of a
motor vehicle, that recreational vessel owners carry insurance. This
alternative would require the insurance companies to maintain prenegotiated salvage contracts within a certain area of operation, thus taking
the burden off the uninformed vessel owner and moving it to the insurance
and salvage companies who are well informed and better equipped to handle
the task.153 This would, however, require a greater deal of governmental
oversight in an area that has thus far gone mostly unregulated.154 Due to the
increased ownership and ubiquity of recreational vessels, it makes a great
deal of sense to treat the insurance and operation of those recreational
vessels in a manner similar to the insurance and operation of motor vehicles.
CONCLUSION
While the concept of a liberal salvage award originated as a
well-intentioned and well-reasoned policy to discourage piracy and
encourage mariners to act as good Samaritans, it contemplated a maritime
ecosystem and economy comprised solely of commercial vessels, and it fails
to meet the requirements of a modern sea that is permeated by recreational
vessels. Courts continue to cling to factors laid out by the Supreme Court in
1869 and refuse to adapt salvage to meet the needs of the recreational vessel
owner. When the difference between towage services and salvage services
can equate to hundreds of thousands of dollars, the law no longer serves to
encourage good Samaritans or curtail piracy—it does the opposite. While
liberal salvage awards still have their place in the commercial maritime
industry, where parties can negotiate on equal footing and decisions are not
made by uninformed and distraught owners of personal vessels, they have
no place in the recreational vessel context and serve only as a tool for
unscrupulous and predatory salvors to prey on the distressed and unaware.
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